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UCC SECTION 2-608: REASONABLE TIME FOR REVOCATION
OF ACCEPTANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before a buyer has accepted non-conforming goods, the Uniform Commercial Code permits him to reject them.' Rejection must occur uithin a
reasonable time after delivery or tender, and is ineffective unless the buyer
seasonably notifies the seller of his rejection. 2 If the buyer does not seasonably
3
take such action, he has accepted the goods and may no longer reject them.
The buyer is not without remedy, 4 however, because while a reasonable time
to reject may have passed,- the buyer may still have an opportunity to revoke
his acceptance under section 2-608.6
As conditions precedent to revocation, the buyer first must show that the
non-conformity substantially impaired the value of the goods to him7 and,
1. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-601 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
2. Id. § 2-602(1).
3. Id. § 2-602, Comment 1 provides in part: -A tender or delivery of goods made pursuant to
a contract of sale, even though wholly non-conforming, requires affirmative action by the buyer
to avoid acceptance. Under subsection (1). therefore, the buyer is given a reasonable time to
notify the seller of his rejection, but without such seasonable notification his rejection is
ineffective."
4. Id. § 2-711 sets forth the various remedies available to a buyer.
5. "The purpose of the rule permitting revocation of acceptance is to give the buyer the
remedial advantages of rejection in those circumstances in which his right of rejection could not
be exercised fully." ! W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 1.4103, at 243 (1964).
6. UCC § 2-608 provides that after a buyer has accepted goods, the acceptance may
be revoked under the following circumstances: "(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of
a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has
accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has
not been seasonably cured; or (b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the sellers
assurances. (2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer
notifies the seller of it- (3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to
the goods involved as if he had rejected them."
7. Id. § 2-608(1). This requirement is considerably stricter than the grounds for rejection,
which permit the buyer to reject goods "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract.
... Id. § 2-601. Just how serious the defect must be in order to be
substantial is not stated in the Code, but it has been suggested that the test for substantial
impairment is subjective with respect to the needs of the buyer. J. White & R. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code § 8-3, at 260 (1972) [hereinafter cited as White & Summers]. UCC § 2-608.
Comment 2 provides in part: "[T]he question is whether the non-conformity is such as will in fact
cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowledge
as to the buyer's particular circumstances."
For example, where evidence supported a finding that a fast-food operation would not function
to meet the special purpose of the buyer, revocation of acceptance of the system was effective.
Systems Consultants, Inc. v. Eng Enterprises. Inc., 123 Ga. App. 641, 182 S.E.2d 188 (1971).
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second, that the acceptance was made either without discovery of the nonconformity, 8 or with knowledge of the non-conformity but on the reasonable
assumption that it would be cured. 9 Revocation of acceptance is not effective
until the buyer notifies the seller.10 Finally, revocation must occur within a
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the
defects, and before any substantial change occurs in the condition of the goods
not caused by these defects. The purpose of this Note is to survey certain
factors the courts have weighed in deciding what constitutes a reasonable time
to revoke acceptance under section 2-608.
Under pre-Code law, a buyer was permitted to rescind a sales contract2
upon the seller's breach. Both the common law" and the Uniform Sales Act'
permitted such rescission. 1 3 The Uniform Sales Act provided that the buyer
However, minor defects repaired immediately after the buyer's complaint do not substantially
impair the value of a car to a buyer. Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa.
Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966). See generally Note, Revocation of Acceptance: The Test for
Substantial Impairment, 32 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439 (1971).
8. Acceptance may be revoked under section 2-608(1)(b) if the acceptance was reasonably
induced by difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances that the
non-conformity would be corrected. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224
S.W.2d 638 (1969); Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Knisley, 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974);
Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Il.App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972); Zoss v.
Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972); Carretta v. Bud Jack
Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 689, 315 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1970); Stofman v. Keenan
Motors, Inc., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1252 (C.P. Phila. County 1973); Moore v.
Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
9. UCC § 2-608(1)(a). If made with knowledge of non-conformity and without the assumption
of cure, acceptance of goods may not be revoked. See id. § 2-607(2). Although he may be
unable to revoke acceptance, the buyer is not prohibited from utilizing other remedies for
non-conformity. See note 4 supra. In Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 1174, 428
S.W.2d 286, 290 (1968), the seller made no assertion either by word or action which could
reasonably be construed as a promise to alter the wheels on the combine machine to meet
appellant's complaints. In fact, the buyer kept and used the combine after being told it could not
be corrected as requested by the buyer, which was inconsistent with revocation. See also Stephens
Indus., Inc. v. American Express Co., 471 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
10. As a definition of notification, UCC § 1-201(26) provides: "A person 'notifies' or 'gives' a
notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know of it,A person
'receives' a notice or notification when (a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the
place of business through which the contract was made or at any other place held out by him as
the place for receipt of such communications."
11. See, e.g., Woods v. Thompson, 114 Mo. App. 38, 88 S.W. 1126 (1905). See also 2 Black
on Rescission and Cancellation §§ 538-40 (2d ed. 1929).
12. Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(d). See, e.g., Frantz Equip. Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa.
459, 468, 88 A.2d 702, 707 (1952).
13. The Code no longer refers to rescission, but instead uses the term revocation. Comment I
to section 2-608 states the purpose of this change in terminology: "Although the prior basic policy
is continued, the buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and
recovery of damages for breach. Both are now available to him. The non-alternative character of
the two remedies is stressed by the terms used in the present section. The section no longer speaks
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was to notify the seller of his election to rescind within a reasonable time or be
barred from rescission.' 4 In deciding cases under the Uniform Sales Act,
courts considered such factors as the difficulty of discovering the nonconformity and the course of dealing between the parties (i.e., the seller's
assurances and attempts to repair the defects before rescission). Cases decided
under section 2-608 continue to follow these principles, and a reasonable time
for revocation will include the same elements as a reasonable time for
rescission.' 5 These factors shall be discussed and analyzed in terms of the
Code provision.
II.

CODE DEFINITIONS AND

COMMENTS

16
The terms "reasonable" and "seasonable" appear throughout the Code.
Although the Code has a section defining "reasonable time," it is less than
satisfactory. Section 1-204 states:
(1) Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any
time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the time agreed or
if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.' 7

In effect, section 1-204 contains a circular definition, leaving the reader with
only a slightly better idea of the applicable standard than before consulting
8
this section of the Code.'
However, the drafters of the Code have provided some clues as to their
intention in the official comments accompanying the Code sections. Comment
4 to section 2-608 states that
[s]ince this remedy [revocation] will be generally resorted to only after attempts at
adjustment have failed, the reasonable time period should extend in most cases beyond
of 'rescission,' a term capable of ambiguous application either to transfer of title to the goods or to
the contract of sale and susceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause of an executed or
executory portion of the contract. The remedy under this section is instead referred to simply as
'revocation of acceptance' of goods tendered under a contract for sale and involves no suggestion
of 'election' of any sort."
14. Uniform Sales Act § 69(3). Under the Code, a buyer may both revoke and recover
damages; but a buyer rescinding under the Uniform Sales Act was limited to recovery of the price
paid for the goods. Compare id. §§ 69(I)(d). (2) with UCC § 2-608, Comment 1
15. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. Some of the cases cited in this Note have
been decided under pre-Code law. However, the principles enunciated in those cases parallel
those of the cases decided under the Code, and section 1-103 provides that: -Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its
provisions."
16. See, e.g., UCC §§ 1-204, 2-602 and 2-607.
17. Id. § 1-204.
18. Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary uses the word reasonable in its definition of reasonable
time: -Such length of time as may fairly, properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having
regard to the nature of the act or duty, or of the subject-matter, and to the attending
circumstances." Black's Law Dictionary 1653 (4th ed. 1968).
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the time in which notification of breach must be given, beyond the time for discovery
of non-conformity after acceptance and beyond the time for rejection after tender."

While the Comment does clarify "reasonable time" to some extent, it adds
little to what is readily ascertainable from an analysis of the following
relevant Code sections.
Section 2-607(3)(a) states that after acceptance a buyer must notify the seller
of breach within a reasonable time after he discovers the breach or he will be
barred from any remedy. "Any remedy" would include revocation of acceptance. 20 Therefore, a buyer must have given notice 2 1 of a breach before
revoking acceptance of the non-conforming goods. Since "[a]cceptance of
' 2 2
the
goods occurs when the buyer . . .fails to make an effective rejection,
buyer's remedy of rejection has been precluded by the acceptance. Therefore,
revocation of acceptance will naturally occur after the time for rejection has
passed.23 Finally, the Code specifically states in section 2-608(2) that revocation "must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should
have discovered the ground for it .... "24 Thus Comment 4 to this section,
when stating that a reasonable time will extend "beyond the time for
discovery of non-conformity after acceptance," merely paraphrases the Code
provision.
Comment 4 to section 2-607 provides that the time of notification of breach
must be reasonable, and
19. UCC § 2-608, Comment 4.
20. Buyers' remedies include rejection and revocation. Compare id. § 2-607(3)(a) with id.
§ 2-607(2) where acceptance with knowledge of non-conformity bars only revocation of acceptance and does not impair other remedies available for non-conformity.
21. Notice of breach does not have to include all defects and objections relied on by the
buyer. It need only inform the seller that there is a breach. Id. § 2-607, Comment 4. See id.
§ 2-605 which requires the buyer to particularize all of the defects he relies on for rejection in
order to avoid waiver of his objections.
22. Id. § 2-606(1)(b).
23. In Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664 (1971), a buyer
discovered defects in a valve testing machine shortly after delivery. The court determined as a
matter of law that the rejection was not within a reasonable time, rejecting the buyer's contention
that a reasonable time for rejection should be extended because of the complexity of the machine.
If the requirements of section 2-608 could be met, including establishing breach, the court
recognized the possibility that the buyer could still revoke his acceptance under section 2-608. Id.
at 479, 296 N.E.2d at 667.
24. If the defect is easily discoverable, a reasonable time to revoke may pass before the buyer
actually discovers the non-conformity. In Michael M. Berlin & Co. v. T. Whiting Mfg., Inc., 5
UCC Rep. Serv. 357, 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), defendant delayed approximately six weeks after
delivery before inspecting steel. The steel was defective and could not be processed through
defendant's machine. The defendant could have easily determined the thickness of the steel with
a micrometer, a measuring device that is easily used and requires no analysis. Although the buyer
waited an additional seven weeks before attempting to reject the steel, the court's determination
that the rejection was ineffective was mainly influenced by the late inspection, implying that a
reasonable time to reject had passed before discovery of the deficiency in the steel: "It is the
finding of the court that the defendant did not inspect the steel within the reasonable time
contemplated in the UCC." Id. at 360.
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is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A
reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different
standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is
designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his
remedy. 2s

The policy enunciated in Comment 4 also applies to revocation. However,
the consumer's remedy must be balanced against commercial fairness to the
seller. While a buyer will not be permitted unjust enrichment, 26 his use of the
goods over a period of time before discovery due to the latency of the defect
will not be deemed unreasonable. 27 Thus, even where a buyer is himself a
25. UCC § 2-607, Comment 4; see Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10. 2 UCC Rep.
Serv. 37 (C.P. Lehigh County 1964).
26. In Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653 (1972), plaintiff purchased an
automobile from defendant. Although he was not satisfied with the car and brought it to the seller
several times for service and correction, he had accepted the car and did not attempt to rescind
the transaction. It was not until after the car was wrecked in an accident, seventeen months and
30,000 miles later, that the buyer attempted ineffectively to revoke. See text accompanying notes
101-02 infra. An attempted revocation of acceptance of a defective car was also ineffective in
Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974), wherein the car had been
driven for two years and over 18,000 miles when the buyer attempted to revoke. Due to the
depreciation of the car, not caused by its own defects, the court held the two year period before
revocation to be unreasonable. See Applebaum v. Falco Leasing Co., 447 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. CL
App. 1969) (revocation eight months after purchase and four months after discovery of defect in
truck, later damaged in an accident, ineffective). See also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible
Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 563-64 (D. Conn. 1967) (buyer's use of hoses after notice of
rescission was a waiver of right to rescind because hoses could have been replaced within hours);
Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 120 N.J. Super. 350. 294 A.2d 62 (1972),
rev'd for jury trial, 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (1973) (question of fact whether revocation
of acceptance of knitting machines two years after delivery ineffective). However, if the goods
change because of their own defects, the policy of unjust enrichment has no application. I W.
Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.4104. at 245 (1964).
27. In American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1301 (N.J.
Super. 1970), sixteen months after the buyer purchased a trailer, it was seized by the police as a
stolen vehicle. The buyer's notice of revocation to the seller was given within two weeks of the
delivery of the defective title. The buyer had no reason to know of or discover the defective title
until the seizure by the police and the revocation thereafter was reasonable. In Chaplin v. Bessire
& Co., 361 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1962), defects in ice-cream storage equipment developed gradually.
The buyer was under a duty to give the seller an opportunity to correct the defects as "the
manifestations of faulty performance may not have appeared serious enough to justify such an
extreme measure as cancellation." Id. at 297. The court distinguished between defects readily
discoverable and those discoverable over an extended period of time during which the buyer had
reason to believe that the defects could and would be corrected by the seller. Id.at 298. The court
was concerned with prejudice to the seller and noted that the one year delay was not detrimental.
"The speculative character of the property is an important factor in determining what is a
reasonable time to rescind." Id., citing Brown v. Hassenstab, 212 Ore. 246, 256, 319 P.2d 929,
934 (1957). Cf. Gargotto v. Sherman, 297 Ky. 597, 180 S.W.2d 565 (1944), which involved the
sale of a restaurant. The buyers discovered the alleged fraud within nine days after taking over
the business, yet continued to operate for two months. The court denied rescission because on
discovery of fraud the buyer must act promptly and "will not be permitted to speculate as to the
result of the trade and then rescind after it proves to be unprofitable." Id. at 599-600, 180 S.W.2d
at 566.
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retailer, the court will consider
the relative sophistication of the parties in
28
applying these standards.

Another Code provision utilizing the reasonable time standard is section
2-602, which requires that rejection of the goods be within a reasonable time
after their delivery or tender. 29 A reasonable time to reject includes an
30
opportunity for the buyer to inspect
the goods, and may be fixed by
3
'
parties.
the
between
agreement
The Code definitions, standing alone, have little interpretative value.
Instead, it is necessary to look to court determinations of reasonable time,
which have been decided on a case-by-case basis. Although courts pay
lip-service to the doctrine that what is reasonable depends upon the nature,
circumstances, and purpose of the transaction, 32 a careful analysis of these
cases indicates that certain factors are controlling. These factors will be
discussed in the following sections.
28. Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 183 N.W.2d 598 (1970), demonstrates a situation
where an inexperienced retailer sought revocation of a contract for the sale of Christmas trees. In
affirming the trial court's holding that the revocation was within a reasonable time, the court
stated: "There was testimony tending to show that immediate discovery of the defects was
difficult because of the time required for the trees to open up after being flattened in transit; that
on several occasions defendant had been expressly assured by plaintiff that the trees delivered
were of good quality; that, because of the slow build-up of the selling season, it was difficult to
judge the merchantability of the trees . . . ; and, finally, that defendant's relative inexperience
limited his appreciation of the defects." Id. at 481-82, 183 N.W.2d at 601. Where the buyer and
seller are in a commercial setting with equal bargaining power, revocation of acceptance must
occur within a "fairly short" period of time. Economy Forms Corp. v. Kandy, Inc., 391 F. Supp.
944, 950 (N.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1975) (revocation of concrete
forms after six months' use).
29. UCC § 2-602(1) provides: "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their
delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller."
30. Time to inspect may be limited to immediately after the sale-a rejection twenty-four
hours later might be deemed untimely, especially where so provided by the parties or by custom.
In Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968), the court held that rejection of
the purchase of a horse twenty-four hours after the sale was untimely, as custom dictates that the
animal be inspected at the time of sale. Cf. Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 2 UCC
Rep. Serv. 37 (C.P. Lehigh County 1964), where the court refused to determine as a matter of
law that plaintiff was guilty of unreasonable delay in discovery and notification that the horse's.
legs were injured. Comment 1 to section 2-602 provides: "The sections of this Article dealing with
inspection of goods must be read in connection with the buyer's reasonable time for action under
this subsection."
31. A warranty of satisfaction in the contract may extend the reasonable time to revoke until
at least the expiration of the warranty period. Maas v. Scoboda, 188 Neb. 189, 195 N.W.2d 491
(1972). Courts will try to honor contract agreements of time unless they are unconscionable. See
3A R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales & Bulk Transfers under the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 14.02[21(c)[i] at 14-22 (1974). See also Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392,
399, 204 A.2d 494, 498-99 (1964) (whether warranty provision that all claims are waived unless
made within eight days was reasonable under the circumstances was a jury question). For a
discussion of Vandenberg, see text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
32. UCC § 1-204(2).
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III.

COURSE OF DEALING

The factors most frequently considered by courts in determining reasonable
time are the presence of the seller's assurances 33 to the buyer that the defect
will be cured and the seller's attempts to repair the defect. 34 \Vhen a buyer
withholds his revocation in reliance on the seller's representations that 36a
35
non-conformity will cure itself, or that the seller will correct the defect,
courts will find the buyer's ultimate revocation 37 to be timely when such
repairs are not satisfactorily made. 38 Since the buyer is generally required to
give the seller a reasonable 39 amount of time to cure the defect, a reasonable
time to revoke should extend at least until it is obvious that such attempts
have failed. 40 The buyer should not be penalized for his continued patience
with a seller who promises to correct defects in the goods.4 ' It has been
33. Id. § 2-608(lXb).
34. The buyer may be required to allow the seller to attempt to repair the defect under the
terms of the Code and applicable express warranty terms. Tiger Motor Co. v McMurtry, 284
Ala. 283, 293, 224 So. 2d 638, 647 (1969).
35. E.g., in Parker v. Johnston, 244 Ark. 355, 426 S.W.2d 155 (1968). defendant sold
plaintiff a vending machine business. The plaintiff's continual complaints were met by defendant's assurances that business would pick up if plaintiff gave it enough time. After six months.
when such did not occur, the plaintiff revoked. The court recognized the buyer's right to revoke,
and commented that it could not be said that the plaintiff "slept on his rights." Id at 359. 426
S.W.2d at 158.
36. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 t1969), Moeller
Mfg., Inc. v. Mattis, 33 Colo. App. 300, 519 P.2d 1218 (1974); Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc v
Knisley, 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35
Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580 (1971); Carretta v. Bud Jack Corp.. 64 Misc. 2d 689. 315
N.Y.S.2d 442 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1970); Stofman v. Keenan Motors. Inc., 63 Pa. D &
C.2d 56, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1252 (C.P. Phila. County 1973); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am.,
Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
37. Cases arise where a buyer has attempted to revoke and was convinced not to by the seller
After a number of such attempts, the buyer's final revocation is still seasonable. See. e.g-. Luther
v. Bud-Jack Corp., 72 Misc. 2d 924, 927. 339 N.Y.S.2d 865. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1973) See text
accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
38. In most cases the seller attempts to repair but does not properly cure the defect W.'here
defendant convinced plaintiffs not to revoke acceptance of a mobile home on the assurance that it
would be repaired to their satisfaction, plaintiffs' revocation of acceptance seven months later was
effective when defendant's attempts at repair were unsatisfactory. Pedrini v. Mid-City TrailerDepot, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 56, 459 P.2d 76 (1969).
39. For a discussion of how long the buyer must wait to give the seller an opportunity to
repair before revoking acceptance, see notes 50-55 infra and accompanying text. UCC § 2-508
gives a seller the right to cure a non-conforming tender after rejection, but it is not clear whether
the Code drafters intended the same right to exist after revocation. For an interpretation of this
Code provision as applied to revocation of acceptance, see Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and
the Consumer Buyer, 75 Com. L.J. 354, 357-58 (1970).
40. See Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional View. 23 V. Miami L Rev
11, 40-41 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Murray]; Note, Buyer's Right to Revoke Acceptance Against
the Automobile Manufacturer for Breach of Its Continuing Warranty of Repair or Replacement,
7 Ga. L. Rev. 711, 729-30 (1973).

41.

Frontier Mobile Homes Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101. 505 S.W.2d 516 (1974)-
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suggested that the reasonable time limitation will commence to run only after
the buyer has attempted such adjustment with the seller, and the seller refuses
or fails to cure the defect, 4 2 or refuses to negotiate a settlement. 4 3 This

guideline applies not only to assurances made after acceptance but also to
have induced the buyer to accept and
situations where the seller's assurances
44
the non-conformity is not cured.
In Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 45 plaintiffs, after
they
signing a purchase agreement, discovered defects 46 in the mobile home 47
were to purchase from the defendant. They paid for and took possession of
the mobile home upon the seller's assurances that the defect would be cured.
Plaintiffs made many unsuccessful attempts during the year to have the
defendant correct the defects, while the home continually deteriorated. 48
Finally, one year after the purchase, the plaintiffs gave the defendant notice
of all known defects and revoked acceptance of the mobile home. Because of
the plaintiffs' reliance on the seller's representations that the defects would be
defects before revocation,
cured and their efforts to have defendant cure4 the
9
the delay of one year was not unreasonable.
The Stroh case presents the question of how long a buyer may wait to allow
the seller to cure before the delay becomes unreasonable. It has been held that
a buyer may withhold revocation until it is apparent that the seller will not
cure;5 0 however, if the buyer delays until after it becomes obvious that the
seller cannot or will not repair, he will lose his right to revoke. 5 1 It is also
42. Murray, supra note 40, at 41.
43. Systems Consultants, Inc. v. Eng Enterprises, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 641, 182 S.E.2d 188
(1971) (buyer attempted to negotiate settlement with seller; after negotiations failed, buyer
revoked acceptance).
44. UCC § 2-608(i)(a). When the buyer notifies the seller of defects and the seller nevertheless
chooses to tender the goods in that condition, he has "assumed the risk of having [them) returned
promptly if the merchandise was not fit for which the purchase was made." Carretta v. Bud Jack
Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 689, 691-92, 315 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
45. 530 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
46. The buyer notified the seller of these defects. Id. at 991. He therefore had given the notice
of breach required by section 2-607(3)(a).
47. Possession of goods does not always indicate acceptance. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). In Stroh, although it was not disputed that the
buyer had accepted the goods, one of the seller's objections to the revocation was the plaintiff's
dominion and ownership of the goods. The court rejected this argument, stating that "notice of
revocation of acceptance is necessarily a recognition by the buyer that the property belongs to the
seller." 530 P.2d at 993.
48. This deterioration was due to defects in the mobile home itself, and thus section 2-608(2)
did not preclude revocation. For a discussion of damage to goods not caused by their own defects,
see notes 98-102 infra and accompanying text.
49. 530 P.2d at 992.
50. Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Pacific Pump & Supply, Inc., 528 P,2d 941 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974); Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483 P.2d 980 (1971); Stofman
v. Keenan Motors, Inc., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1252 (C.P. Phila. County
1973).
51. See Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W.2d 286 (1968).
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clear that the seller does not have an unlimited time to cure the defects.52
Even where the purchase contract includes an express warranty, the buyer
may revoke before the expiration of the warranty period.5 3 This reflects a
general tendency of the courts to side with the buyer.- 4 However, the buyer
that the defects will be
who delays although the seller has made no assurances
s
cured will hot be afforded the same treatment.5
In contrast to a "no-assurance" situation is the case where a buyer's actual
attempts at revocation are met with the seller's promises to correct the
non-conformities. In Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Knisley, - 6 the buyer of a
used car attempted to rescind the transaction after learning that the seller's
representations were false. Each time he attempted to rescind, the dealer's
agents persuaded him not to, promising to correct the non-conformities. As a
result, the automobile was in the dealer's shop so often that the buyer had
little opportunity to use or inspect it. s7 The court held that the buyer's
ultimate revocation was effective, stating that
although the vehicle had been driven some 1,500 miles, the buyer had had little
opportunity for inspection or continued use, since it was so frequently being repaired.
Every attempt at revocation was forestalled by dealer's assurances and footdragging. 58
52. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969) (car taken for repairs
approximately thirty times in year following sale; revocation within eleven months effective);
Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Pacific Pump & Supply, Inc., 528 P.2d 941 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974)
(three years after power plant delivered and several attempts to repair unsuccessful); Stofman v_
Keenan Motors, Inc., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1252 (C.P. Phila. County 1973)
(at least six repair attempts over the course of six weeks unsuccessful).
53. Apparently, courts view the warranty solely as an obligation of the seller to the buyer
and, thus, the buyer need only give the seller a "reasonable" opportunity to cure non-conformities
and defects. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 293, 224 So. 2d 638, 647 (1969) (car
warranted for twenty-four months-revocation after eleven months); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (revocation after nine months on
twelve month warranty). Contra, Maas v. Scoboda, 188 Neb. 189. 195 N.W.2d 491 (1972) (buyer
required to make good faith attempt to adapt silo to his purposes for one year under a one year
warranty of satisfaction included in the contract).
54. "The question we must consider is just how long the buyer must wait and how many
unfulfilled promises may be made before he is entitled to revoke his acceptance of an automobile
and be returned the purchase price. Our sympathies lie with those who repeatedly return their
cars for repairs or service, and get them back in almost the same condition as when the
complaints were originally registered." Stofman v. Keenan Motors, Inc., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56,
59, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1252, 1254 (C.P. Phila. County 1973).
55. Stephens Indus., Inc. v. American Express Co., 471 S.W.2d 501, 507 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971). Although the seller did service a defective machine, there was no evidence of any promises
by the seller to cure the defects, nor any indication that the buyer was induced by the seller to
retain the machine. Revocation was attempted about one year after delivery and was held to be
unreasonable.
56. 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. CL 1974).
57. Id.at 35.
58. Id. at 37-38. For a discussion of revocation and the "lemon" automobile, see Whaley.
Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The UCC's "TARR"-Baby. 24 Drake L. Rev.
52, 72-78 (1974).
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Since the buyer is virtually required to permit the seller to attempt to repair

the 'defects, he must await the time necessary for the seller to effect such a
cure. Therefore, the courts have held almost uniformly that under such
circumstances the seller is estopped from raising the argument that the buyer's
revocation is ineffective due to the passage of time. 59
IV.

DIFFICULTY OF DISCOVERY

Under the Code there is a direct correlation between the difficulty of
discovery of the non-conformity in the goods and the determination of a
reasonable time in which to revoke acceptance. 60 The reasonable period
commences from the point when the buyer discovers, or should have discovered, the non-conformity. 6 ' Since a buyer will necessarily require a substantially greater amount of time to discover defects which are latent, he should
accordingly be given a respectively longer amount of time in which to revoke.
The elements of latency may be segmented-it may be due to the complexity
of mechanical goods, 62 a defect which unfolds gradually, 63 or simply a defect
64
hidden from plain view.
In Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 65 the plaintiff purchased a
crane which he found to be very noisy and unable to move on soft sand. The
noise persisted even after softer clutch linings and a muffler were installed,
until the crane eventually became virtually inoperative. At this point, he gave
defendant notice of revocation. The court found that because of the complexity of the machine, 66 plaintiff was justified in relying on the seller's assurances 67 that it would be corrected; thus, plaintiff revoked within a reasonable
59. See Frontier Mobile Homes Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101, 505 S.W.2d 516
(1974); Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 530 P.2d 989 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975);
Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483 P.2d 980 (1971); Performance
Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972); DeCoria v. Red's Trailer Mart, Inc.,
5 Wash. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971); Pedrini v. Mid-City Trailer Depot, Inc., I Wash. App.
56, 459 P.2d 76 (1969).
60. UCC § 2-608(2) provides in pertinent part that "Irlevocation of acceptance must occur
within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it
....
" Therefore, it follows that the amount of time allowed to discover a defect is proportionate
to the difficulty involved in that discovery.
61.
Id.
62.
Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 106-08, 192 N.W.2d
580, 588-89 (1971); Henry v. Don Wood Volkswagen, Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 991, 995 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1974).
63. Chaplin v. Bessire & Co., 361 S.W.2d 293, 294-95, 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Birkner v.
Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 481-82, 183 N.W.2d 598, 601 (1970); Melms v. Mitchell, 266 Ore.
208, 220-21, 512 P.2d 1336, 1342 (1973) (en banc); Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa.
Super. 392, 398-99, 204 A.2d 494, 498 (1964).
64. Cf. American Paper & Pulp Co. v. Denenberg, 233 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1956).
65. 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580 (1971).
66.
wrong
finally
67.

While the complexity did not impede the buyer from discovering that something was
with the crane, he was not aware of the seriousness of the defects until the crane was
inoperative. Id. at 107-08, 192 N.W.2d at 589.
Id. The buyer's reliance on the seller's assurances also affected the outcome of the case.
See Part III supra.
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time. It may be argued that on these facts, the buyer should not have been
permitted to revoke, since he was obviously aware that something was wrong
with the crane. However, discovery requires actual knowledge of the defect or
non-conformity, 68 and a buyer is not required to revoke until he discovers the
seriousness of the defect. 69 In Uganski, the extent of the defects did not
become evident until the machine became inoperative. Inasmuch as the
ordinary consumer cannot realistically be expected to promptly discover
defects in complex mechanical goods, Uganski illustrates that such discovery
will be extended until the buyer
realizes not only the existence, but also the
70
extent of the non-conformity.
Similarly, a defect in car wiring was not reasonably discoverable until it
caught fire. 7 ' This "defect was such that it would have been virtually
impossible for the plaintiff to discover it before acceptance of the vehicle." 7Therefore, revocation which occurred shortly after the fire was considered
timely by the court. 73 In acknowledging the requirement that revocation must
occur prior to a transformation in the condition of the goods which was not
engendered by their own defects, the court pointed out that there had been no
substantial change in the74condition of the car between the date of the fire and
the time of revocation.
The second type of latent defect is that which unfolds gradually. The defect
(or non-conformity) is present when the goods are accepted, but it lies
dormant for a certain period. No particular knowledge or action on the part
of the buyer is necessary for5 discovery. Rather, the requirement is fulfilled
7
merely by passage of time.
68. 2 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-608:21 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as
Andersonl.
69. As a condition precedent to revocation, the buyer must show that the defect substantially
impairs the value of the goods. UCC § 2-608(1).
70. The buyer probably would not be able to revoke before the breakdown unless he could
show that the existing defect of which he was aware substantially impaired his use of the crane.
In formulating a subjective test for substantial impairment, one observer submitted that an
annoying noise in a car may be sufficient where the noise aggravates the driver's neurological
problems. Note, Revocation of Acceptance: The Test for Substantial Impairment. 32 U. Pitt, L
Rev. 439. 441 (1971).
71. Henry v. Don Wood Volkswagen, Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 991. 995 tTenn- Ct. App.
1974).

72. Id.
73. Id. Revocation did not actually occur until about six weeks after the incident- Although
the plaintiff returned the car to the dealer the following day. he awaited the dealer's determination of whether the damage was covered by the warranty, Revocation occurred about one month
after being informed that the damage was not covered. It is clear that the buyer was entitled to
wait until he knew whether he was covered by the warranty before invoking the remedy of
revocation, and the month delay thereafter was reasonable since there was no substantial change
in the condition of the car during this time.
74. Id. Inasmuch as substantial damage to the automobile was caused by an already existing
defect, it would be difficult to hypothesize what further substantial damage could have occurred
after the fire.
75. Similar to this is a situation where a passage of time in combination with certain actions
by the buyer is necessary for the discovery of non-conformities. See text accompanying notes
79-82 infra.
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A classic example of this situation was presented in Q. Vandenberg & Sons,
N.V. v. Siter. 76 Defendant purchased tulip and hyacinth bulbs which were
apparently in good condition when delivered, but developed spots one month
later. An expert examined the bulbs a few weeks before Easter, at which time
7
the defendant learned of the defects and attempted to revoke acceptance. 1
The nature of the defects was such that they developed only as the season
progressed and could not be discovered until flowering time. The court held
that it was a jury question whether the contract provision for an eight-day
limitation to present claims was unreasonable under these circumstances. 78
In Vandenberg, the delay was caused by the difficulty of discovery of the
defect due to its inherent nature. However, gradual discovery of a nonconformity may also be due to the nature of the transaction itself. In Melms v.
Mitchell,79 the defendant agreed to sell his cordwood business to the plaintiff,
representing that a sufficient amount of dry wood to fill purchase orders could
be severed and sold immediately. In addition, the plaintiffs purchased defendant's stock of cut dry wood and therefore had no immediate need to search
for more. When this was used up, plaintiffs began to cut more from the
property, and found that in the areas where defendant had instructed them to
begin cutting, there was not sufficient dry wood to fill their orders. Attempts
to find dry wood in other areas of the land were time consuming and
unrewarding. Plaintiffs then brought suit to rescind 80 the contract for the
purchase of the business. The court held that "[blecause of the very nature of
the transaction-a sale of standing wood-it is only to be expected that
plaintiffs might not discover right away that the quantity of dry wood was not
as represented.""' It was only by surveying and investigating other portions of
the land that the plaintiffs discovered with certainty that the quantity of wood
The court held that
available did not conform to defendant's representations.
82
revocation was within a reasonable time.
Another type of defect, closely related to the previous example, is a defect
hidden from plain view. In American Paper & Pulp Co. v. Denenberg"3
76. 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
77. Id. at 394-95. 204 A.2d at 498. Inspection was made thirty-five days before Easter, which
was the trade custom. An expert had previously examined some of the bulbs in November when
the original spots were noticed and discovered defects on a few of the bulbs. However, these
defects could not be discovered unless the bulbs were cut open. Id.
78. Id. at 397, 204 A.2d at 498. "Undoubtedly the parties may by their contract limit the time
for the buyer's notice of claim for breach of warranties, but the limitation must be reasonable. A
limitation which renders the warranties ineffective as regards latent defects, literally covered by
the warranty but not discoverable within the limitation period of the contract, is manifestly
unreasonable and therefore invalid under § 1-204 of the code." Id. at 398, 204 A.2d at 498.
79.
266 Ore. 208, 512 P.2d 1336 (1973) (en bane).
80. Id. at 219, 512 P.2d at 1342. While the Code speaks of revocation of acceptance, the
courts still often refer to the term rescission which was used in the Uniform Sales Act.
81. Id. at 220, 512 P.2d at 1342.
82. Id. at 221, 512 P.2d at 1342. The contract was for the sale of the cordwood business and
was not a sale of land, as plaintiffs cut and sold wood located on defendant's property. The
contract was therefore for a sale of goods and the Code governed that transaction. See UCC
§§ 2-105, 2-107.
83. 233 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1956).
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a contract provided for the sale of paper, with delivery to a ship. for resale to
overseas customers. Samples of the paper were sent directly to the buyer but
did not arrive until after the ship carrying the goods had left. The buyer
found the samples unsatisfactory, and paid only part of the purchase price
with a view towards reaching an agreement with his purchasers overseas.
When the goods arrived, the overseas customers rejected them due to their
extremely inferior quality. The court found the buyer's subsequent rescission
timely, as the quality and condition of the goods could not be determined until
84
their arrival overseas.
Meins presented a situation where the defects were not really dormant, as
they were in Vandenberg, but where a passage of time was necessary in order
for the buyer to discover that the seller's representations were false. In a sense
then, the time during which the buyer surveyed the land was an inspection
period. Although the Code does refer to inspection before acceptance, 5 such
is not specified in terms of revocation. It seems apparent, however, that the
buyer should have an opportunity to inspect-such time being included in the
stated reasonable time for discovery. Where, as in Melns, the actual character of the goods requires time-consuming "inspection" by the buyer, the time
in which he should discover defects should be extended accordingly. Similarly, in American Paper, the practical impossibility of inspection (and the
concomitant discovery of such deformities) prior to its actual delivery,
induced the court to extend the period.
In addition to the tests which have been delineated, the courts are
influenced by other factors. Whether a court will even consider the difficulty
of discovery in determining what constitutes a reasonable time may depend on
whether the buyer is an ordinary consumer or a merchant.8 6 Additionally, the
court may recognize that the seller's representations, in combination with the
character of the goods, can result in a gradual discovery of the defect by the
7
buyer.8
Moreover, where a simple inspection would have uncovered the defects, a
delayed revocation based upon a late inspection is untimely. 8 It should be
recognized, however, that in such a case it is not the difficulty of discovery
that has caused a late revocation, but rather the failure of a dilatory buyer to
inspect.
It is oversimplifying the issue to state that discovery requires actual
84.

Id. at 613.

85.

UCC § 2-513.

86. Michael M. Berlin & Co. v. T. Whiting Mfg., Inc...5 UCC Rep. Serv 357 tN Y_ Sup.
Ct. 1968). "We believe it will be a rare case in which a business buyer is given substantial
additional time in which to reject because the defect was 'difficult to discover
White &
Summers, supra note 7. at 262.
87. UCC § 2-608, Comment 3 states: - "Assurances' by the seller under paragraph tbi of
subsection (1) can rest as well in the circumstances or in the contract as in explicit language ued
at the time of delivery. The reason for recognizing such assurances is that they induce the buyer
to delay discovery .... "
88. See note 24 supra. Cf. Miron v. Yonkers Raceway. Inc . 400 F 2d 112. 119 t2d Cir
1968).
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knowledge, 89 since courts must also look to when discovery should have been

made. In practice, in determining a reasonable time for discovery and thus
the reasonableness of revocation, the courts consider factors such as latency of
defect and ease of inspection, as well as the stated considerations of "good
faith" 90 and "substantial justice." 91
V.

DAMAGE TO GOODS

Section 2-608 of the Code provides that revocation must occur "before any

substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects.

' 92

While a buyer will not be penalized for a deterioration of the

existing defects, significant deterioration 93 or actual damage 94 to the goods
caused by the buyer's delay may prevent effective revocation. In addition to
being a condition precedent to revocation, the existence of deterioration or
damage is an element courts consider in determining whether the buyer has

revoked within a reasonable time. This reflects a policy of commercial fairness
and "substantial justice.

' 95

At the same time, the courts must be careful not

to deny a good faith buyer his remedy. This policy requires a careful
balancing of the interests of both parties. The buyer should allow the seller to
attempt repairs while the seller must permit the buyer to revoke when his
attempts to repair fail.
During the interval that the seller is attempting repairs, the goods may
deteriorate due to the buyer's continued use of them. 96 Generally, continued
89. Anderson, supra note 68, § 2-608:21. "[T]he mere fact that the buyer has suspicions that
the goods do not conform and that such nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the
contract does not in itself require that he immediately give notice." Id.
90. UCC § 2-608, Comment 5.
91. Id., Comment 6.
92. Id. § 2-608(2).
93. Such deterioration is caused by the buyer's continued use of the goods over an extended
period of time. Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 120 N.J. Super. 350, 354,
294 A.2d 62, 64-65 (1972), rev'd for jury trial, 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310A.2d 491 (1973); Eckstein
v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974). It has been held that deterioration
which occurs while the seller attempts to remedy the defects will not bar a subsequent revocation.
Moeller Mfg. Co. v. Mattis, 33 Colo. App. 300, 519 P.2d 1218 (1974). But see Eckstein v.
Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974), wherein a car was driven over 18,000
miles for a period of two years while seller tried but failed to cure defects. Substantial
depreciation in condition of car during the two-year delay before attempting to revoke was held to
be unreasonable.
94. Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. App. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653 (1972). Where serious damage to
the goods is caused by the defects, revocation is not barred. Henry v. Don Wood Volkswagen,
Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 991, 992 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (four days after purchase of new car,
wiring under dashboard caught fire, causing substantial damage).
95. This policy is one of not allowing a buyer to take unfair advantage of a seller. UCC
§ 2-608, Comment 6. The Comment also states that minor defects in the goods should be
disregarded. Id.
96. The use of the goods by the buyer does not in itself bar revocation of acceptance.
Anderson, supra note 68, at 250. In Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1972), plaintiff drove a new car home and noticed that the engine "missed" and on
examination discovered other defects. Approximately two months later, he filed suit for rescis-
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use of the goods, when based on the seller's assurances that the defects will be
cured, is not a bar to revocation. In most instances, the seller will perform
repairs and the buyer will then try to make use of the goods. If the defects are
still present, the seller will again attempt to repair. This pattern may be
repeated many times, 97 and the buyer should not be penalized for a natural
deterioration during the passage of time when he is allowing the seller to cure.
Two additional policy reasons are submitted for this treatment: first, the
buyer should be given an opportunity to test the goods after repairs; and
second, it would be unfair to deprive the buyer of use while the seller is
attempting repairs.
It has been held, however, that use of a car for two years, while a seller
tried to cure its defects, barred revocation because of the "substantial depreciation and a 'change in the condition of the goods . . . not caused by their
own defects.' "98 However, the general rule is that continued use of the goods

is proper where the intent is to mitigate damages. 99
On the other hand, when the buyer alters the goods and then attempts to
revoke, courts have refused to allow the revocation.' 0 0 In that event, the
goods have been substantially changed by the intentional acts of the buyer.
Cooper v. Mason' 0 presents an excellent factual situation in which to
evaluate these policy considerations. There, a buyer purchased an automobile
from defendant and, unsatisfied with its performance, returned it several
times for service and correction. Seventeen months and thirty thousand miles
later, the vehicle was wrecked in an accident and the buyer attempted to
return it to the seller. The court refused to allow the revocation since the car
had been substantially damaged as a result of the accident, and not because of
the pre-existing defects. It appears that, had the accident not occurred, the
revocation would still have not been seasonable as "[i]t would seem that
seventeen months and 30,000 miles exceed a reasonable time for revocation of
sion. The car was stored when suit was filed, but two months later, the buyer used it again Both
before and after suit was filed, the defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to fix the car
Revocation nine months after delivery was not unreasonable. Id. at 229-30. But where a buyer

continues to use the goods after being told the defects cannot be corrected, he will not be
permitted to revoke. Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co.. 244 Ark. 1166. 428 S.W2d 286 (196YS
97. See Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry. 284 Ala. 283. 224 So. 2d 638 (1969). where a car wa%
repaired over thirty times before the buyer revoked.
98. Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 15, 321 N.E.2d 897. 906 (1974)
99. Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co.. 120 N.J. Super. 350, 294 A 2d 62
(1972), rev'd, 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (1973) (reversal for jury trial). The lower court
ruled that a two-year delay before revocation was unreasonable since the machines %%eresubject
to wear and tear. The Superior Court reversed, stating that plaintiff may have been induct to
continue to use the machine by the seller's assurances that defects would be corrected, and that
reasonable time was a jury question. 125 N.J. Super. at 256-57. 310 A.2d at 494. The court also
noted that continued use to mitigate damages is permitted. Id. at 258. 310 A 2d at 494
100. See, e.g., Marbelite Co. v. Philadelphia. 208 Pa. Super. 256. 222 A.2d 443 (966) (use of
traffic signal equipment by city); Lang v. Fleet, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 361. affd. 193 Pa Super 365.
165 A.2d 258 (1960) (use of ice cream freezer for one year. and then connecting compressor unit
with air conditioner).
101. 14 N.C. App. 472. 188 S.E.2d 653 (1972).
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the purchase of the automobile under the most liberal interpretations of the
term."' 02
As demonstrated by Cooper, in determining whether goods were substantially changed, courts not only consider whether actual damage occurred, but
also whether there exists any deterioration caused by a dilatory buyer or
deceptive seller.
VI. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Other factors courts rely upon in deciding whether revocation was within0 3a
reasonable time fall into the general category of commercial good faith. 0 4
These include: determination of which party was at fault for the delay,'
prevention of prejudice to the buyer or seller, and unjust enrichment of the
buyer.
The buyer must promptly revoke acceptance of perishable goods.' 0 - Deterioration of these goods will occur, and inasmuch as this may not be the
result of existing defects,' 0 6 revocation is precluded. 107 The basic aim here is
to prevent commercial bad faith and to afford the seller the opportunity to
mitigate damages, possibly by finding another buyer for the non-conforming
goods. 108
If delay in revocation by a dilatory buyer will prejudice the rights of the
seller, the revocation is unreasonable if the buyer could have done so sooner.' 09
102. Id. at 474, 188 S.E.2d at 655 (emphasis in original).
103. The Code requires that good faith be present in all transactions: see UCC § 1-102(3)
("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided
in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care
prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement . . . ."); id. § 1-201(19) ("'Good faith'
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."); id. § 1-203 ("Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
104. The "fault" referred to here is to be distinguished from the delay resulting from the
seller's assurances and attempt to repair. See Part III supra.
105. A.C. Carpenter, Inc. v. Boyer Potato Chips, 28 Agri. Dec. 1557, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 493
(1969) (potatoes-eight days unreasonable); Mazur Bros. & Jaffe Fish Co., 3 UCC Rep. Scrv. 419
(Veterans Admin. Contract App. Bd. 1965) (shrimp-five days unreasonable).
106. Similarly, acceptance of a live animal should be revoked promptly since it will be
difficult to meet the burden of proving that the defect existed at the time the animal was
accepted. Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Grandi v
LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965), where a horse was obtained for the purposes of
breeding. Revocation three months later, when the buyer discovered that the horse was a gelding
and could not be used to breed, was effective since the non-conformity obviously existed at the
time the horse was purchased.
107. A buyer cannot speculate and then rescind after the transaction appears unprofitable.
Gargotto v. Sherman, 297 Ky. 597, 180 S.W.2d 565 (1944).
108. See White & Summers, supra note 7, at 261, discussing the policies behind notice
provisions.
109. In Applebaum v. Falco Leasing Co., 447 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969), defendant
sold a new truck to the plaintiffs. Within two to three weeks after the purchase, trouble
developed and within the next four to six weeks more extensive defects were found to exist. Tle
truck was returned for repairs six to eight times over the next six months. Finally, three months
later, the "disgusted" plaintiff dumped the truck in the defendant's yard. While acknowledging
that the truck was out of service for more than two-thirds of the time, the court nevertheless held
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In Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 110 the defendant purchased toy animals
from the plaintiff to sell during the Christmas season. Less than half of the
expected toys were delivered and on December 1, defendant informed plaintiff that he did not want the rest of the shipment."'I Another shipment
arrived, however, and plaintiff told defendant not to open it but to simply
return the toys. Instead, the defendant kept the toys for several months before
returning them to the plaintiff. 1"2 In holding that there was no evidence that
' 3
the defendant gave the plaintiff notice of revocation prior to mid-February ii
when he returned the unsold goods, the court stated: "In view of the seasonal
nature of the toy business and the somewhat faddish
demand for certain toys,
' 4
this delay in giving notice was unreasonable." "1
In a relatively similar case,"15 defendants purchased carpeting from the
plaintiff. Within two weeks after delivery, the defendants discovered that the
carpeting had changed color and the nap was defective. They notified the
seller's agent and requested that he take it back. When he refused to do so,
defendants retained the carpeting, and did not bring an action to rescind the
sale until over a year later. The court held that the defendants had waived
their rights to rescind the sale by their long delay.' 16
that plaintiffs had not attempted to rescind within a reasonable time. They did not attempt to
rescind until dumping the truck, which had additionally been damaged in an accident by this
time, in defendant's yard, and there was "no just cause or excuse . .. for their failure to do so "
Id. at 803. Similarly, in D'Orsay Equip. Co. v. United States Rubber Co . 199 F Supp 427 (D
Mass. 1961), aff'd. 302 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1962). plaintiff purchased rubber milk-dispensing tubes
from defendant and later sought to rescind because they would not function properly The
contract provided that claims for breach of warranty were to be made within thirty days Here.
the plaintiff met neither the thirty day contract requirement nor the reasonable time requirement
of section 2-608. Although the plaintiff had received complaints about the tubes from his
customers, he accepted and paid for subsequent shipments and did not attempt to revoke until
approximately one year after the defects were brought to his attention. "This clearly would not be
notification within a reasonable time .... " Id. at 433. And in Lehigh, Inc. v Stevens, 205 Kan.
103, 468 P.2d 177 (1970), defendant-buyer was aware of defects in the vending machines. but
continued to buy additional machines and pay instalments for several months No notice of
breach of warranty, and no attempts to rescind or tender back the machines were made until
after suit was filed. The court affirmed the trial court's determination that there was no effective
attempt to rescind. Id. at 108, 468 P.2d at 182.
110. 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (1970) (en band
111. The court noted the distinction between notice of breach and notice of revocation. and
decided that this was an "adequate and timely notice of breach." Id. at 348, 474 P-2d at 273
112. The seller could have reasonably assumed by the buyer's silence that he had decided to
retain the goods after all. This situation is somewhat analogous to acceptance of an offer b)
silence, which is generally permitted. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo. Contracts § 33 (1970)
113. Notice of revocation of one small lot was given prior to the revocation in February 78
Wash. 2d at 348, 474 P.2d at 273.
114. Id. at 348-49, 474 P.2d at 273. An important consideration in the court's decision in
Hays was the prejudice to the seller by the buyer's delayed revocation. which occurred long after
Christmas. Where "there is no evidence to indicate that the seller was any more prejudiced by the
cancellation . . . than it would have been a year earlier," reasonableness of the revocation is a
jury question. Chaplin v. Bessire & Co.. 361 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Ky. Ct App 19621
115. Olson Rug Co. v. Smarto, 55 fI1. App. 2d 348. 204 N E 2d 838 11965i
116. Id. at 353, 204 N.E.2d at 841.
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Where the seller's own actions contribute to the delay, a buyer's resultant
delay in revocation is reasonable. In DeCoria v. Red's TrailerMart, Inc., lII
plaintiff, the purchaser of a defective mobile home, telephoned the defendant
over forty times requesting, to no avail, that he correct the defects. A
repairman was finally sent, but he failed to cure the defects. The plaintiff
continued to complain and finally, more than one year after delivery, brought
suit to revoke the acceptance. The court found the delay reasonable.' 8
A situation may arise where the seller avoids the buyer. Because of the
seller's unavailability, the buyer cannot notify him of defects. When the seller
finally receives such notice, he cannot assert the defense of unreasonable delay
in revocation.' 19
Lanners v. Whitney 20 demonstrates the many facts, circumstances' 2' and
requirements of section 2-608 which a court must consider in deciding
whether a buyer's revocation occurred within a reasonable time. Lanners
involved the purchase of a used airplane. Included in the contract was
defendant's agreement to conduct a "100-hour"' 22 inspection of the plane in
order to determine its airworthiness and to replace any defective parts. The
plane was delivered to plaintiff with assurances that the inspection had been
made. Several days after delivery, the plaintiff took a long flight and
encountered difficulties with the plane, and upon his return so notified the
defendant. An inspection by the FAA revealed that the plane had been
unairworthy at the time of delivery. A second inspection confirmed this
finding, and plaintiff was in constant communication with defendant until his
revocation three weeks later.
In analyzing the case, the court reasoned that: (I) plaintiff reasonably relied
on defendant's representations that the plane was airworthy; (2) plaintiff
failed to reject within a reasonable time and had therefore accepted the plane;
(3) the unairworthy condition of the plane materially impaired its value to the
plaintiff; (4) plaintiff was induced to accept the plane without inspection
because of defendant's assurances; (5) plaintiff gave the defendant notice of
breach immediately upon discovering the defects and had thus preserved his
remedy of revocation; (6) prior to the inspections, plaintiff had no certain
knowledge of the extent of the defects in the airplane; and (7) plaintiff
117. 5 Wash. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971).
118. Id. at 895-96, 491 P.2d at 243.
119. In Davis v. Vintage Enterprises, Inc., 23 N.C. App. 581, 209 S.E.2d 824 (1974), a buyer
of a mobile home was not given the keys to the home until three weeks after its delivery. Upon
moving in, he discovered that serious flooding resulted when it rained. Numerous calls to tle
seller went unanswered. Finally, an employee made several visits to the trailer, but rendered no
substantial repairs. The court remanded the case to determine whether the buyer's letter of
complaint to defendant was a rejection or a revocation. Id. at 588-89, 209 S.E.2d at 829-30. It
was necessary to determine which remedy existed, as rejection and revocation are governed by
different rules.
120. 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967).
121. Generally, more than one factor will be present in a case. For the purposes of this Note,
discussion of cases was generally limited to the specific principle being illustrated.
122. A "100-hour" inspection is the examination of an aircraft as prescribed by the FAA. 247
Ore. at 226, 428 P.2d at 400.
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attempted to adjust the differences between the parties. The court concluded
that
[c]onsidering all the circumstances, we hold the delay of less than three weeks,
between . . . when the unairworthy condition of the [plane) became known, and . . .
the date on which notice
was given defendant of his intention to rescind, was not an
23
unreasonable delay.1

VII. CONCLUSION
As stated in the Code, determination of the timeliness of revocation will
turn on the nature, purpose and circumstances of the transaction.' 24 In
applying this standard, courts consider factors such as course of dealing,
difficulty of discovery, damage to the goods, and commercial good faith.
Thus, what ostensibly appears to be a vague definition has been rendered
more certain by court interpretations of reasonableness. As has been demonstrated, "[tlime, ih the abstract, is not essential. It is material so far only as,
when associatedwith other circumstances, it may produce injurious or unjust
consequences."'' 2 5 Although this standard is applied on a case-by-case basis,
and what is reasonable in one case may be unreasonable in another, the
factors considered, i.e., the "'other circumstances," are relatively consistent.
Therefore, reasonable time for revocation of acceptance, albeit lacking a
precise meaning, is not an arbitrary concept-it may be defined in each
situation by reference to principles of good faith and substantial justice which
govern the factors that courts consider and weigh in their final determination
of what constitutes a reasonable time.
Doreen Stolzenberg
123. Id. at 235, 428 P.2d at 404.
124. UCC § 1-204(2).
125. Hogan v. Tucker, 77 S.W. 197, 199 (Ky. 1903), citing Hoggins v. Becraft. 31 Ky (1
Dana) 28, 30 (1833) (emphasis added).

